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 Betreff des Beitrags: about Berija
BeitragVerfasst: Do 2. Aug 2007, 01:22 

Beiträge: 1624
hier mal eine Zusammenfassung über Berija, die eindetuig der von Bill Bland und GvS widerspricht (leider auf englisch):


Some individuals erroneously view Beria as a supporter of Stalin who died fighting a rear-guard action trying to prevent the final destruction of that which Stalin had created when, in fact, he was nothing more than a careerist/revisioni st opposed to bona fide Marxist-Leninism. He also had the distinction of being disliked or despised and rarely trusted by virtually everyone in and out of the Soviet government. What follows are prime examples of comments to this effect:


MOLOTOV: I regard Beria as an agent of imperialism. Agent does not mean spy. He had to have some support--either in the working class or in imperialism. He had no support among the people, and he enjoyed no prestige. Even had he succeeded in seizing power, he would not have lasted long.

...a big scum.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 340

MOLOTOV: I consider Khrushchev a rightist, and Beria was even further right. We had the evidence. Both of them were rightists. Mikoyan too.

...Being a rightist, Khrushchev was rotten through and through. Beria was even more of a rightist and even more rotten.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 336-337

MOLOTOV: ...he (Beria) was, in any event, a dangerous character.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 343

MIKOYAN: From the date when Comrade Stalin fell ill, and the doctors told us he would not recover, the chief concern of each of us was to preserve the iron unity of the Party leadership collective, since Party unity had been secured during Stalin's lifetime.

Many comrades may ask how is it that members of the Central Committee who knew Beria for many years weren't able to recognize in their midst this foreign and dangerous person for such a long time. By the way this wasn't such a simple matter, it wasn't so easy to achieve. In the first place, we didn't know all the facts. In the second place, the facts occurred at various times and, taking each one separately, they didn't have the same significance which they take on when you see them all together. We mustn't forget that there was a good deal of skillful work in masking these facts, in muddying up their significance and interpreting them in a totally different meaning. There were many instances of Beria's positive work, and in the shadow of these successes the negative facts were hidden.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 107

CHUEV: Beria is called a diehard enemy of Soviet power.

MOLOTOV: I don't know whether he was a diehard or some other kind of enemy, but I do know he was an enemy.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 343

MOLOTOV: Beria, to my mind, was not one of us. He crept into the party with ulterior motives.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 2___O32-234

MOLOTOV: A man [Mikoyan] of very few principles, unrestrained and easily influenced by others.... He began to be closely associated with Khrushchev after Stalin's death. That relationship had not existed before. It only developed in Khrushchev's later years. Khrushchev's best friends had been Malenkov and Beria.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 365


... he [Beria] himself not only underestimated this theory, but simply didn't understand it--in his speeches, both published and unpublished, you'll find very little Marxism-Leninism. He did not know Marxism-Leninism. He had a poor theoretical foundation; the book mentioned by Comrade Molotov was written not by him, he was using it to earn points for himself.

Beria had a hostile response to statements that Stalin was a great continuer of the work of Lenin, Marx, and Engels.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 74

MOLOTOV: He (Beria) was unprincipled. He was not even a communist. I consider him a parasite on the party.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 339

TEVOSYAN (Member of the Central Committee): Yesterday, we learned from the speech of Comrade Kaganovich that this scoundrel Beria protested against referring to Comrade Stalin--along with the names of Marx, Engels, Lenin--when speaking about the teachings which guide our Party. That's how far this scoundrel went.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 159

MOLOTOV: It is totally obvious that he kept his plan secret, a plan aimed against building Communism in our country. He had another course--a course for Capitalism. This faint-hearted traitor, like other faint-hearted traitors whom the Party has dealt with satisfactorily, was planning nothing less than a return to Capitalism.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 30

MOLOTOV: Beria strained might and main to grab leading positions. Among the reactionary elements he was the activist. That's why he strove to clear the way for a return of private property. Anything else lay outside his field of vision. He did not avow socialism. He thought he was leading us forward, but in fact he was pulling us back, back to the worst.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 232


"Beria offered assurances to Czechoslovakia that the USSR would not continue to interfere in Czech internal affairs, and he wrote a personal letter to Marshal Tito apologizing for the manner in which Stalin had treated him. The MGB officer who would carry the letter to Tito showed it to me. The final sentence said, "Let us cast the past aside and look ahead to the resumption of diplomatic relations between our two nations."

Deriabin, Peter. Inside Stalin's Kremlin. Washington [D.C.]: Brassey's, c1998, p. 148

I must again draw your attention to Beria's attempts to establish ties with Rankovich and with Tito, which Comrade Malenkov has already mentioned.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 30


Molotov and Kaganovich could not prevent the reform projects of Malenkov, Beria, and Khrushchev. Malenkov wanted to increase payments to collective farms so as to boost agricultural production; he also favored giving priority to light-industrial investment. Khrushchev wished to plough up virgin lands in the USSR and end the decades-old uncertainty about supplies of bread. Malenkov and Beria were committed to making overtures to the USA for peaceful coexistence: they feared that the Cold War might turn into a disaster for humanity. Beria desired a rapprochement with Yugoslavia; he also aimed to withdraw privileges for Russians in the USSR and to widen the limits of cultural self-expression. Malenkov, Beria, and Khrushchev supported the release of political convicts from the labor camps. Quietly they restrained the official media from delivering the customary grandiose eulogies to Stalin.

Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 591

After Stalin's death, Beria demonstrated his "generosity" by letting out a lot of criminals. He wanted to show off his "liberalism. " However, in actual fact, this action of his was directed against the people because these criminals who got out of jail went right back to their old trades-- thieving and murdering.

Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 118


Beria... advanced the following argument: "Why should socialism be built in the GDR? Let it just be a peaceful country. That is sufficient for our purposes.... The sort of country it will become is unimportant. "

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 334

MOLOTOV: A stable Germany was good enough for him.... I was in favor of not forcing a socialist policy, while Beria favored not supporting socialism at all.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 335

MOLOTOV: It became quite clear that Beria did not hold Communist positions. In this situation we felt that in Beria we were dealing with someone who had nothing in common with our Party, a person of the bourgeois camp, the enemy of the Soviet Union.

The capitulating essence of Beria's proposals regarding the German question is obvious. He virtually demanded capitulation before the so-called "Western" bourgeois states. He insisted that we reject the course to strengthen the people's democratic order in the GDR, which would lead to socialism. He insisted on untying the hands of German imperialism, not only in West Germany but in East Germany....

You see how what Beria had previously concealed in his political persona was now exposed. Also, what we previously saw only vaguely in Beria, we now began to see clearly. We now clearly saw that here was someone alien to us, a man from the anti-Soviet camp.

It was not so easy to expose Beria. He artfully disguised himself, and for many years--concealing his true face--he sat in the leadership center.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 29

MOLOTOV: What Beria proposed would never have come up for discussion in Stalin's time. Stalin made a public statement when the GDR was created, that this was a new stage in the development of Germany, and that there could be no doubts about this. Stalin was the sort of man to sacrifice everything for the sake of socialism. He would never have abandoned the conquest of socialism.

I objected that there could not be a peaceful Germany unless it took the road to socialism.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 336

ANDREYEV: It was only lately, in the German question, and in other questions, that we saw his bourgeois degeneracy.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 155


ANDREYEV: And Beria, of course, at times did great work, but this was work done for a disguise, and in this was the difficulty of exposing him. He created himself a halo, that, for example, during the war he was during enormous work, etc., he was blackmailing in the name of Comrade Stalin. He was difficult to expose.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 157

BAGIROV (Candidate Member of the Presidium of the Central Committee): Beria--this chameleon, this most evil enemy of our Party, our people--was so cunning and adept that I personally, having known him for some 30-plus years before his exposure by the Presidium of the Central Committee, could not see through him, could not draw out his true enemy nature. I can only explain this as my excessive gullibility, and the dullness of my Party and Communist vigilance toward this double-dealer and scoundrel. This will be a serious lesson for me, too.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 78

Another provocation. .. an anonymous letter from Italy stated: "Comrade Stalin, in your car there is an explosive device underneath the hood." We looked... of course, there was no explosive. Then another letter from Italy came: "Comrade Stalin, it seems that your living expenses are extremely high... costing the Government money!"

Stalin decided after this to set up a commission, under Malenkov, to look into the finances. The commission detailed all of the expenses of running the government Dacha. Malenkov brought this to Orlov in order for him to sign. Orlov refused because Stalin was a light eater, hardly drank, and took no liquors. A bottle of "Tsinandali" was enough to last him for two weeks. It was proven that it was Stalin's "friends," under the aegis of Beria, who really lived it up, charging the cost to Stalin's budget. Vodka was the main culprit in the inflated costs charged to Stalin's name.

Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 66


SARKISOV (he worked in Beria's security force for 18 years) I also know that Beria cohabited with a certain Sophia. At Beria's suggestion, through the Chief of the Health Department of the USSR MVD, she had an abortion. I repeat, Beria had many, many such relationships.

On Beria's instructions, I kept a special list of women with whom he cohabited. Later, at his suggestion, I destroyed this list. However, I kept one list. In this list are the names, surnames, and addresses of telephone numbers of more than 25 such women. This list is in my apartment in my jacket pocket. (The list to which Sarkisov was referring was found, it contained 39 names of women.).

One or 1 1/2 years ago, I learned for a fact that, as a result of his relationships with prostitutes, Beria contracted syphilis. He was treated by a doctor in the MVD clinic, initials U.B. I don't remember his name.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 121

Everything had tended to indicate my father's complete trust in Beria and his dependence on him, but of this one could never be quite sure. I shall never forget how startled I had been by something my father said in 1941 during the first days of the war. I was visiting Beria's wife at their dacha. My father had always encouraged my friendship with her. I was talked into staying the night. Next morning my father suddenly called up in a fury. Using unprintable words, he shouted, "Come back at once! I don't trust Beria!"

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Only One Year. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 376

Beria, of course, was a bloody butcher, a rapist, and a revolting person.

Berezhkov, Valentin. At Stalin's Side. Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol Pub. Group, c1994, p. 351


"Beria was absolutely insolent. He tried to find the smallest insignificant detail of perceived slight, in order to try and get you fired or arrested... this was in order to make Stalin either nervous or upset. This came to such a state of outright provocation that once while Stalin was away from the Dacha, Beria with his personal entourage started to snoop in the offices of Stalin, rummaging through his papers and documents. After one such "snooping search," Stalin's transistor radio went missing. Needless to say, it was Stalin's own bodyguards who were suspected and blamed. The offices were turned upside-down. Time passed and no transistor was found. Then, the Guard Kuzin who was shoveling snow, came across the transistor. Who else could do something of this caliber? Only Beria and his clique, of well-masked and hidden enemies of Stalin and the Soviet Union!"

Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 66

The newspaper "Niedelia-Sunday, " in an article about Beria, wrote that in the Ritsa Lake, there was an attempt on the life of Stalin, that Stalin remained alive only because Beria covered him with his own body. Tukov, who was there, said: "Beria would place anyone else in front of a bullet, but never himself. There was no attempt on the life of Stalin there. This is just yellow journalism by the newspapers. What really happened there was that Beria pushed me into the water when I caught a fish. Stalin was very upset with Beria and scolded him as he would a child for this act of stupidity."

Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 96


Svetlana says, "Children have instincts about people like this. There was something unpleasant about him [Beria]. The others--Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich-- had a certain dignity, they talked to my father as equals, calling him Joseph, and ti, the familiar form of 'you". Beria could not handle these older statesmen who remembered and loved Nadya {Stalin's deceased wife], and who had been close to the family for a long time. They never flattered my father. Beria was always flattering him. Father would say something, and Beria would immediately say, "Oh yes, you are so right, absolutely true, how true!" in an obsequious way. None of the others, even if they did agree with him, were flapping their wings like this and being 'yes men'. He was a creep."

Richardson, Rosamond. Stalin's Shadow. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 158

With typical cunning Beria played on my father's bitterness and sense of loss [at my mother's death]. Up to then he had simply been an occasional visitor to the house in Sochi and my father was on vacation there. Now that he had my father's sympathy and support, however, he quickly wormed his way up to the job of First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party....

Once he was First Secretary in Georgia, it didn't take Beria long to reach Moscow, where he began his long reign in 1938. From then on he saw my father every day. His influence on my father grew and grew and never ceased until the day of my father's death.

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 136

I speak advisedly of his influence on my father and not the other way around. Beria was more treacherous, more practiced in perfidy and cunning, more insolent and single-minded than my father. In a word, he was a stronger character. My father had his weaker sides. He was capable of self-doubt. He was cruder and more direct than Beria, and not so suspicious. He was simpler and could be led up the garden path by someone with Beria's craftiness. Beria was aware of my father's weaknesses. He knew the hurt pride and the inner loneliness. He was aware that my father's spirit was, in a sense, broken. And so he poured oil on the flames and fanned them as only he knew how. He flattered my father with a shamelessness that was nothing if not Oriental. He praised him and made up to him in a way that caused old friends, accustomed to looking on my father as an equal, to wince with embarrassment.

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 137

MOLOTOV: Hence it follows that we must seriously dig into his biography, into his past, in order to fully understand his rotten, treacherous role in our country, in our Party. We have studied his biography very little. Let as now take this up more seriously.

How did it happen, that such an inveterate enemy like Beria, could get into our Party and into its leadership organs?

Without going into the deeper reasons for this type of fact, one can give a simple answer to this question: This is the result of insufficient vigilance on the part of our Central Committee, including Comrade Stalin. Beria found certain human weaknesses in Comrade Stalin, and who doesn't have them? He skillfully exploited them, and was able to do so for many, many years.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 32

From the stories of his guards Stalin appears to have been a self-effacing, fatherly person. On various occasions he angrily protested having watched documentary films showing him in situations that had never taken place. When Beria and Malenkov argued that the scenes were "needed for history," he opposed them, saying: "Leave me alone with such history."

... Beria's book on the history of Bolshevism in the Caucasus, which heaped praise on Stalin, was not written (as generally believed) upon Stalin's request; rather, it was written on Beria's initiative, because Beria wanted to ingratiate himself with Stalin.

Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner's, c1990, p. 149

STALIN'S DAUGHER SVETLANA: Grandma Olga and Anna used to say--which always sounded strange to me but now I don't think it's so strange--"Your father could be influenced very easily. He could be influenced by good people: Kirov had a wonderful influence on him. Beria had a terrible influence."

Richardson, Rosamond. Stalin's Shadow. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 209

MALENKOV: As you see, comrades, great people, too, can have weaknesses. Comrade Stalin had these weaknesses. We must say this, in order to bring up the need for collective party leadership properly, like Marxists, the need for criticism and self-criticism in all branches of the party, including, before all else, the Central Committee in the Presidium of the Central Committee.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 176


"There is undocumented testimony that Beria intended to usurp power as Stalin grew older. Stalin may have known this, as their relations grew noticeably cooler in the last year and a half of his life. Among the many witnesses who have told me about this, most interesting was the testimony of M. S. Vlasik, wife of Lt. Gen. Vlasik, former chief of the Main Administration of the Ministry of State Security (the KGB). For more than 25 years, Vlasik had been Stalin's chief of personal security: he knew much and was trusted by the boss. Beria hated him, but Stalin would not allow him to be touched. A few months before Stalin died, however, Beria managed to compromise Vlasik, as well as Poskrebyshev, and to have them removed from Stalin's entourage. Vlasik was arrested and given 10 years' prison and exile. When he returned after Stalin's death, he said he was totally convinced that Beria had 'helped' Stalin to die after first removing his physicians.

Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 333

Vlasik went on to say that, once he had been summoned by Beria for interrogation, 'I knew I could expect nothing but death, as I was sure they had deceived the Head of government.'

Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 570

"Beria certainly was very happy when my father died; he had always worked towards that. He had removed my father's whole entourage, starting with Vlasik, who had been there 30 years. The doctor was arrested, the personal secretary was arrested, so something had been brewing there. I hate folklore and making guesses, but something was up."

"One of the guards attended the autopsy, Vlasik's successor, a man named Krustalyov. They could not permit a post-mortem to go ahead unsupervised because by this time nobody trusted anybody. He sat there, and it made such an impression on him that afterwards he collapsed completely and drank heavily, and of course he was fired. He said that what hit him was when they opened the head, and he saw the brain. One of the medics said, "This is obviously a very fine brain, quite out of the ordinary." Krustalyov never got over it."

Richardson, Rosamond. Stalin's Shadow. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 252-253

Stalin began to decline more rapidly after his 70th birthday. His blood pressure was continually high, but he did not want doctors, he did not trust them. He still listened half-heartedly to Academician Vinogradov, but gradually Beria convinced him that 'the old man [Vinogradov] , was suspect' and tried to foist other doctors on to him. Stalin, however, would have no one new. When he heard that Vinogradov had been arrested, he cursed ominously but did nothing about it. He now finally stopped smoking, but continued his unhealthy life-style in all other respects, rising late and working into the night.... he would not entrust himself to doctors.

...His old belief in Georgian longevity was shaken by a series of dizzy spells which knocked him off balance.

Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 529

Voznesensky dared to cross Beria's path, and before Beria finished with him, Voznesensky was just a shadow of his former self.

I remember that more than once during this period Stalin asked Malenkov and Beria, "Isn't it a waste not letting Voznesensky work while we're deciding what to do with him?"

"Yes," they would answer, "let's think it over."

Some time would pass and Stalin would bring up the subject again: "Maybe we should put Voznesensky in charge of the State Bank. He's an economist, a real financial wizard."

No one objected, but nothing happened. Voznesensky was still left hanging.

Stalin obviously felt a certain residual respect for Voznesensky.

Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 251

Apparently even after these arrests, Stalin felt a certain amount of goodwill toward Shakhurin and Novikov. He used to turn to Beria and Malenkov during dinner and ask, "Say, are Shakhurin and Novikov still in jail?"


"Don't you think it might be all right to release them?" But Stalin was asking the question to himself. He was just thinking out loud. No one would say anything, and the matter would be left up in the air until sometime later when he'd bring it up again. Once he even went so far as to say, "You should give serious thought to releasing Shakhurin and Novikov. What good are they doing us in jail? They can still work." He always directed these remarks to Malenkov and Beria because they were in charge of the case against Shakhurin and Novikov.

Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 253

Vasili Stalin [Stalin's son] wrote in a letter to Khrushchev: "When Beria spoke of arresting Redens, Comrade Stalin protested sharply.... But Beria was supported by Malenkov. And Comrade Stalin said, 'look into it very carefully... . I don't believe Redens is an enemy.'"

Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 422

Redens was arrested in 1937. That was the first blow. Soon afterward both the Svanidzes were arrested.

How could such a thing happen? How could my father [Stalin] do it? The only thing I know is that it couldn't have been his idea. But if a skillful flatterer, like Beria, whispered slyly in his ear that "these people are against you," that they were "compromising material" and "dangerous connections, " such as trips abroad, my father was capable of believing it.

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 77

MIKOYAN: A few days before his death the late Ordzhonikidze, in a private conversation with me said "I don't understand why Stalin doesn't trust me. I am completely loyal to him, I don't want to fight with him, I want to support him, but he doesn't trust me. Beria's schemes play a large part in this--he gives Stalin wrong information, but Stalin trusts him."

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 110

ANDREYEV (Member of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet): In this sense, Beria's plan differed from the plan of other traitors of the Soviet people, former enemies. As we now know, this plan was about:

Firstly, worming his way into the trust of Comrade Stalin, whatever the cost. This he considered a fundamental condition for his enemy activity. And so in any way he tried to worm his way into Stalin's trust. Did he achieve this? Undoubtedly he did. Comrades here have already mentioned that Comrade Stalin had a weakness of being too trusting. This is the truth.

The second, and obviously the central, task in his plan, was to destroy the Bolshevik nucleus of our leadership.. .. to undermine the trust Comrade Stalin had in various leaders, to sow strife among the Party leaders and the leaders of the government.

Was he able to achieve any of this? Certainly, he was successful for a time.

Now Comrade Voroshilov spoke about Comrade Ordjonikidze. Ordjonikidze was the most honest, most noble Bolshevik, and you may be sure that he was a victim of Beria's intrigues... .

Beria divided Comrade Stalin and Ordjonikidze and Comrade Ordjonikidze' s noble heart couldn't take it; thus Beria took out of commission one of the best leaders of the Party and friends of Comrade Stalin.

Going on. All of us Chekists and the new ones too, know what a warm key friendship there was between Comrade Stalin and Molotov. We all considered this a natural friendship, and were happy for it. But then Beria appeared in Moscow, and fundamentally changed everything, Comrade Stalin's relationship with Comrade Molotov was ruined. Comrade Molotov began to be subjected to undeserved attacks from Comrade Stalin. This was Beria, successfully undermining the close friendship of Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov with his intrigues.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 154


In 1948 Stalin began to bring pressure to bear on Rapava, Georgia's Minister of Internal Affairs, to provide him with a compromising dossier on my father [Beria].

Beria, Sergo. Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 217

When he [my father, Beria] gradually began to open my eyes to certain facts and to get me ready to understand that there was a conflict between Stalin and him, he always took care to emphasize that there was no one equal to Stalin when it came to perseverance and capacity to achieve his aims.

Beria, Sergo. Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 290

MIKOYAN: Even before Beria's coming to Moscow, and especially when he was in Moscow, he was able to skillfully, with every truth and every untruth, worm his way into Comrade Stalin's trust. Even during Comrade Stalin's life, especially in recent years when Comrade Stalin couldn't work as he used to, when he had begun to meet with people less often, read information less often, at that time Beria skillfully got himself made Chief Information Officer to Comrade Stalin.

I must say that lately Comrade Stalin didn't trust Beria. Beria was forced to recognize, at his last session of the Presidium of the Central Committee, that Comrade Stalin didn't trust him,...

During the war Comrade Stalin divided the MVD and State Security. It seems to me that this, too, was done from a certain lack of trust in him, otherwise there was no point in dividing the ministry. This had to be done in order to take away his rights as a Minister. At that time they appointed him to the Council of Ministers and to the GOKO. This, too, was one of the first signs of a lack of trust. But in spite of all this, Comrade Stalin showed him a great deal of trust.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 109


...Everyone close to us hated him [Beria],... Everyone in the family loathed him and felt a premonition of fear, especially my mother, who, as my father himself told me, "made scenes" and insisted as early as 1929 that "that man must not be allowed to set foot in our house."

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 19

Beria's role was a terrible one for all our family. How my mother feared and hated him! And it was her friends...who were the first to fall, the moment Beria was able to convince my father that they were hostile to him.

...The spell cast on my father by this terrifying evil genius was extremely powerful, and it never failed to work.

...Beria's role in the Civil War in the Caucasus was highly ambiguous. He was a borne spy and provocateur. He worked first for the Armenian nationalists and then for the Reds as power swung back and forth. Once the Reds caught him in the act of treason and had him arrested. He was imprisoned awaiting sentence when a telegram arrived from Kirov, who was chief of all operations in the Caucasus, demanding that he be shot as a traitor.... I can't imagine, moreover, that Kirov would ever have allowed Beria's election to the Central Committee.

But Kirov used to live in our house. He was one of us, an old colleague and a friend. My father liked him and was attached to him.

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 137

"During the civil war," Svetlana reminds us, "Beria fought first with the Reds and then with the Whites--as the situation changed so did his allegiance. At one time, fighting for the Whites, he was taken prisoner by Kirov and Ordzhonikidze who were then leading the Red Army there, and they ordered his execution. But this order was overlooked: he was a little Mr. Nobody and the army had to move on and there were other matters to consider. So they forgot to shoot him."...

"Nobody in our family liked him [Beria], though at the beginning my father regarded him as a very good worker. Yes, he committed this sin."...

The only thing that mattered to Beria was power, even in those early days. He was both immoral and apolitical: his only creed was that the ends justify the means....

Volodya said, "Everyone in our family knew then he was a scoundrel. Nadya spoke out against him quite openly, so did my mother, Anna Sergeyevna. He was quite obviously a villain. He wanted to isolate Stalin from his relatives, to close every possible uncontrolled channel through which reality might reach Stalin."...

"He hated all of our family," adds Kyra [the niece of Stalin's wife]. Svetlana said, "he is very clever, and very manipulative. He got everything he wanted. And he was a horrible man with a horrible face. According to my [Svetlana] mother too he was horrible! She wouldn't have him around. She was outspoken enough to tell father [Stalin] that he shouldn't invite him to the house. Every time they went on vacation to the Black Sea Beria would visit them because Georgia was where he was stationed--he was boss of the KGB at the time. She loathed him, couldn't stand him, couldn't sit near him. She called him a 'dirty old man' and without doubt he noticed her antipathy. There were quarrels over him with father; he would arrive and my mother would scream at Father, "Don't let him come here! Don't let him in!"

Richardson, Rosamond. Stalin's Shadow. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 102-104

He [Ordzhonikidze] was well acquainted with Beria from his days in the Caucasus and couldn't stand him.

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 139

MALYSHEV (Member of the Central Committee): For example, I as a minister, have worked under the leadership of several comrades--Comrade Molotov, Comrade Kaganovich, and Beria. I must say, that each time you go to report on some matter to the comrades, you go with different feelings. You go to comrade Molotov with one feeling--we know that he is a strict leader, demanding, but whenever you go to him you know that there will be no hasty decisions, adventurist decisions, if you made a big and serious mistake you will never be struck at because of his mood. Then there's comrade Kaganovich-- a sometimes hot tempered fellow, but we know that he does not bear grudges. He'll erupt, but it quickly passes and he makes the right decision. Beria is another thing. We minister's knew that you would enter his office a minister, but who you would be on return--you didn't know. Perhaps a minister, or perhaps you'd land in prison. This was his method: "A knock on the head"--and you'd come out staggering. In one word, Beria's leadership style was the crude style of a dictator, no Party spirit. And speaking of Party spirit, I worked under Beria during the war, in charge of tanks,... and I was convinced that he never had any Party spirit.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 83

I shall come back later to Beria, who seems to have had a diabolic link with all our family and who wiped out a good half of its members....

Had it not been for the inexplicable support of my father, whom Beria had cunningly won over, Kirov and Ordzhonikidze and all the others who knew Transcaucasia and knew about the Civil War there would have blocked his advance.

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 58

MIKOYAN:... He [Beria] feigned being a buddy--first of one-person, then another--saying one thing to your face and another behind your back, he alienated the comrades -- first some, then others--and stacked the deck for his purposes. We all saw this, but didn't give it the significance which it all took on after Comrade Stalin was gone.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 109


The question as to whether those close to him plotted Stalin's death remains unanswered, although Svetlana is convinced of Beria's complicity, and by implication of others' too.

Richardson, Rosamond. Stalin's Shadow. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 255

MOLOTOV: Some people believe that Beria killed Stalin. I believe this possibility cannot be excluded.... Beria was treacherous and unreliable. He could have done the deed just to save his own skin.... I too am of the opinion that Stalin did not die a natural death. He wasn't seriously ill. He was working steadily... And he remained very spry.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 326

Stalin could not be permitted to live, I believe, due to the risk that he would attempt a countercoup. The Politburo, therefore, overthrew Stalin in February 1953 to avert a purge. Stalin's timely death was the solution--Beria' s, Malenkov's, and possibly others'--to the problem of disposing of the deposed Stalin. Discounting the information from official Soviet sources, I conclude that Beria was responsible for the death of Stalin, Malenkov was his accomplice, and Khrushchev & Bulganin were accessories after the fact.

Deriabin, Peter. Inside Stalin's Kremlin. Washington [D.C.]: Brassey's, c1998, p. 131


EDITOR: Molotov wonders with good reason whether Stalin really died a natural death. Shortly before Beria was liquidated by his fearful colleagues, he took credit for Stalin's death. He confided to Molotov that he had "saved them all," implying that he had killed Stalin or at least seen to it that the stricken Stalin did not receive adequate and timely medical attention.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 161

Melodramatic accounts of Stalin's death, of which there is no shortage, claim that Stalin was murdered. "It is most likely that the denial of medical care made not the slightest difference." But Beria clearly thought it had. "I did him in," he later boasted to Molotov and Kaganovich. "I saved you all!"

Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 641

CHUEV: Beria himself was said to have killed him.

MOLOTOV: Why Beria? It could have been done by a security officer or a doctor. As he was dying, there were moments when he regained consciousness. At other times he was writhing in pain. There were various episodes. Sometimes he seemed about to come to. At those moments Beria would stay close to Stalin. Oh! He was always ready...

One cannot exclude the possibility that he had a hand in Stalin's death. Judging by what he said to me and I sensed.... While on the rostrum of the Mausoleum with him on May 1st, 1953, he did drop hints.... Apparently he wanted to evoke my sympathy. He said, "I did him in!"--as if this had benefited me. Of course he wanted to ingratiate himself with me: "I saved all of you!" Khrushchev would scarcely have had a hand in it. He might have been suspicious of what had gone on. Or possibly... All of them had been close by. Malenkov knows more, much more, much more.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 237


Beria would not call the doctors and instead turned on the servants: 'Why did you panic? Can't you see Comrade Stalin is sound asleep? All of you get out and leave our leader in peace, I shall deal with you in due course!'

Malenkov gave Beria some half-hearted support. According to Rybin, there seemed to be no intention at all of getting medical help for Stalin, who must have had the stroke some six to eight hours before. Everyone seemed to be following a scenario that best suited Beria.

Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 572

Beria did not hide his look of triumph. All the other members of the Politburo, including Malenkov, were afraid of this monster. The death of one tyrant promised a new orgy of bloodletting by his successor. Exhausted by all his exertions, and now sure that Stalin had crossed the dividing line between life and death, Beria dashed away to the Kremlin for some hours, leaving the other leaders at Stalin's deathbed. I have already outlined the version of Beria, as first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, now forcing the great political game that he had long planned. His hasty departure for the Kremlin was possibly connected with his effort to remove from Stalin's safe documents which might contain instructions about how to deal with him, a last will that might not be so easy to contest, made while Stalin was in full control of his faculties.

He returned to the dacha in a mood of self-confidence and proceeded to dictate to his crestfallen colleagues that they must prepare a government statement to the effect that Stalin was ill and also publish a bulletin on the state of his health.

Meanwhile the last act of the drama was being played out. Stalin's son, Vasili, kept coming in and shouting in a drunken voice, 'They've killed my father, the bastards!'.. . Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Khrushchev and some others were weeping openly.

...On her knees, her head on his chest and wailing like a peasant, was Istomina, Stalin's housekeeper who for some 20 years had looked after him, accompanied him on all his trips to the south and even on two of the three international wartime conferences.

Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 573-574

So the staff rang through to Malenkov to alert the politburo of what had happened [to Stalin], but they could do nothing without Beria. Beria could not be found, he was out carousing with women. After finally being tracked down he marched in drunk at around 3 a.m. Looking triumphant, according to the assembled group, he glanced at the comatose Stalin and summarily dismissed their fears telling them to leave him to sleep in peace. He forbade anyone to use the telephone, ordered the politburo to reconvene in the morning, and went away. He returned at 9 a.m., again with members of the politburo, to take another look.

Stalin had lain untreated for over 24 hours; it was 10 hours since he had been found. Beria now ordered doctors to be summoned from the Academy of Medical Sciences, choosing intellectuals rather than practitioners presumably since the latter were mostly behind bars, but possibly also for his own reasons. The doctors nervously applied leeches to the back of Stalin's neck and head, took cardiograms, X-rayed his lungs and administered a series of injections. Meanwhile Beria dashed off to the Kremlin and spent some time in Stalin's study, his inner sanctuary, presumably removing from the safe documents that only he would have known about, which in his own interests should not be found. Instructions as to the political succession were never found, nor was a personal diary of Stalin's, a black exercise book in which the leader recorded his personal thoughts and plans....

Svetlana by this time had been summoned and stood immobilized amidst the frantic scene beside her father's bed. She is convinced that there was more to Stalin's stroke than met the eye.

"Beria finally plotted to murder my father. I don't know how he plotted it, and there is a lot of folklore about it. But they withdrew medical help for at least 12 hours; the whole politburo, Beria among them, arrived at the scene instead of the doctors. He was the one who had said hours earlier, "Nothing has happened. You are panicking. The man is sleeping." And then turned around and walked away.

Richardson, Rosamond. Stalin's Shadow. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 248

We did everything we could to raise Stalin to his feet. We saw he was unconscious and therefore completely oblivious of his condition. But then, while the doctors were taking a urine sample, I noticed he tried to cover himself. He must have felt the discomfort. Once, during the day, he actually returned to consciousness. Even though he still couldn't speak, his face started to move. They had been spoon-feeding him soup and sweet tea. He raised his left hand and started to point to something on the wall. His lips formed something like a smile. I realized what he was trying to say and called for attention. I explained why he was pointing with his hand. There was a picture hanging on the wall, a clipping from the magazine Ogonyok. It was a reproduction of a painting by some artist of a little girl feeding a lamb from a horn. At that moment Stalin was being spoon-fed and was trying to say, "I'm in the same position as that lamb which the girl is feeding from the horn. You're doing the same for me with a spoon."

Then he began to shake hands with us one by one. I gave him my hand, and he shook it with his left hand because his right wouldn't move. By these handshakes he conveyed his feelings.

No sooner had Stalin fallen ill than Beria started going around spewing hatred against him and mocking him. It was simply unbearable to listen to Beria. But, interestingly enough, as soon as Stalin showed these signs of consciousness on his face and made us think he might recover, Beria threw himself on his knees, seized Stalin's hand, and started kissing it. When Stalin lost consciousness again and closed his eyes, Beria stood up and spat. This was the real Beria--treacherous even toward Stalin, whom he supposedly admired and even worshipped yet whom he was now spitting on.

Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 318

MOLOTOV: During his [Stalin] last days I had in some sense fallen out of favor.... I had seen Stalin for five weeks before he died. He was absolutely healthy. They called for me when he was taken ill. When I arrived at the dacha some Politburo members were there. Of non-Politburo members, only Mikoyan and myself, as I recall, had been called. Beria was clearly in command.

Stalin was lying on the sofa. His eyes were closed. Now and then he would make an effort to open them and say something, but he couldn't fully regain consciousness. Whenever Stalin tried to say something, Beria ran up to him and kissed his hand.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 236

They all felt that something portentous, something almost of majesty, was going on in this room and they conducted themselves accordingly.

There was only one person who was behaving in a way that was very nearly obscene. That was Beria. He was extremely agitated. His face, repulsive enough at the best of times, now was twisted by his passions--by ambition, cruelty, cunning, and a lust for power and more power still. He was trying so hard at this moment of crisis to strike exactly the right balance, to be cunning, yet not too cunning. It was written all over him. He went up to the bed and spent a long time gazing into the dying man's face. From time to time my father opened his eyes but was apparently unconscious or in a state of semi-consciousness. Beria stared fixedly at those clouded eyes, anxious even now to convince my father that he was the most loyal and devoted of them all, as he had always tried with every ounce of his strength to appear to be. Unfortunately, he had succeeded for too long.

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 7

During the final minutes, as the end was approaching, Beria suddenly caught sight of me and ordered: "Take Svetlana away!" Those who were standing nearby stared, but no one moved. Afterward he darted into the hallway ahead of anybody else. The silence of the room where everyone was gathered around the deathbed was shattered by the sound of his loud voice, the ring of triumph unconcealed, as he shouted, "Khrustalyov! My car!"

He was a magnificent modern specimen of the artful courtier, the embodiment of Oriental perfidy, flattering, and hypocrisy who had succeeded in confounding even my father, a man whom it was ordinarily difficult to deceive.... But I haven't the slightest doubt that Beria used his cunning to trick my father into many other things and laughed up his sleeve about it afterwards. All the other leaders knew it.

Now all the ugliness inside him came into the open--he couldn't hold back. I was by no means the only one to see it. But they were all terrified of him. They knew that the moment my father died no one in all of Russia would have greater power in his grasp.

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 8

And that was why he [Beria] had been unable to conceal his joy at my father's death.

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Only One Year. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 375

...The members of the government then rushed for the door.

All of them except the utterly degenerate Beria spent those days in great agitation, trying to help yet at the same time fearful of what the future might bring. Many of them shed genuine tears. I saw Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Bulganin, and Khrushchev in tears.

Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 11

VOROSHILOV: We were by our Stalin's side until his last breath, and Beria immediately demonstrated his "activity"-- as if to say don't forget, I'm here.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 145


Workers in Communist East Berlin staged demonstrations, riots, and a general strike on June 17-19, 1953, against the work quotas and compensation scheme of the East German government. Soviet tanks and troops halted the disturbance, killing 16 rioters. On the first day of the disturbances, Beria dispatched Deputy Minister Kobulov with a group of 10 MGB officers to conduct on-the-scene investigations. Only after their departure (but before Soviet tanks and troops put down the uprising) was the Politburo told of Kobulov's mission.

With the MGB and MVD under his command, Beria came within a hair's breath of seizing control of the country. He planned to become the new Stalin, to achieve absolute power over the Party apparatus from the Politburo down.

Deriabin, Peter. Inside Stalin's Kremlin. Washington [D.C.]: Brassey's, c1998, p. 148-149

[According to Khrushchev] Abakumov, who actually supervised the prosecution [in the Leningrad Affair] was Beria's man; he never reported to anyone, not even to Stalin, without checking first with Beria."

Deriabin, Peter. Inside Stalin's Kremlin. Washington [D.C.]: Brassey's, c1998, p. 181

MOLOTOV: ...Beria stopped keeping me informed during Stalin's last years. I was on the sidelines then. Under Khrushchev I was entirely in the dark about some events.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 292

BULGANIN: All these facts tell us that Beria was acting on the principle of: the worst things are, the better things are for him.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 46

MOLOTOV: Although it was written by certain of Beria's self-serving cronies, he didn't hesitate to put his name on the brochure, which was destined to play its role in his progress toward a central job. Beria also used other methods for his careerist goals. The methods of a smooth operator and unforgivable careerist, when activity in work is hardly explained by ideological ideas or true faithfulness to the Party. We can't deny his organizational abilities, which showed in organizing and implementing a number of economic measures. The Party had to use these abilities when they were used to execute necessary tasks. The Party does not refuse to use even the abilities of exposed wreckers, when it has the opportunity to do so.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 34

SHATALIN (Secretary of the Central Committee): In the light of materials we now have on Beria, it is absolutely clear that presenting the Doctor's Affair was useful only to him and his protectors. He wanted to use this incident to make points as a humanitarian and brave initiator. What does this rogue care for the interests of the State.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 119

VOROSHILOV: However, the question reasonably arises, why was this subject able to freely work in Party leadership and government for so long, without being exposed sooner, why did he have such a great authority, and hold such high Party and State positions? The question is entirely legitimate.

First and foremost,... Beria is an insidious and cunning enemy, a consummate adventurist, schemer, who knows how to skillfully worm his way into the trust of a leader, who can hide his base plans for a long time and wait for the proper moment. He witnessed the daily life of the great Stalin. Together with all of us he knew that Stalin, as the result of intense work, often fell sick in recent years, obviously this circumstance to a certain extent was the basis for Beria's vile tactics. He waited in the hope that sooner or later Stalin would be no more. As the facts have now shown, after the death of Stalin this adventurist was counting on the speedy realization of his criminal plans against the Party and the State. That's why he was in such a hurry after the death of Stalin, or perhaps he was being hurried....

In all these characteristics of his, Beria feared Stalin, he ingratiated himself with Stalin, but skillfully, in his own way; he would whisper all manner of disgusting things, would completely confuse him. And we could tell just by Comrade Stalin's mood, when we met either for business or other reasons, we could all feel whom Beria had been "whispering" against that day.

Stickle, D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992, p. 143


Deep down, Stalin no doubt despised Beria, but he could not manage without him. Beria was his inquisitor, his right-hand man and his spy. Beria, for instance, informed him that Berlin had for a long time been planning to carry out a terrorist act against the Soviet leader. According to some information received, he said, a special Messerschmitt Arado-332 was to drop a trained group of terrorists from Vlasov's Russian Army of Liberation, while other reports suggested that the Germans were going to leave a commando group behind as they retreated. Almost every month Beria told Stalin of new measures he had taken to increase his master's security. But Stalin needed Beria for a range of other duties. For instance, he needed to know why 140 out of 400 fighter planes, allocated for use on the Kalinin and Western fronts, had to be withdrawn from service after three or four days of action. On the other hand, he did not like it when Beria poked his nose into the affairs of Staff Headquarters and the General Staff.

Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 480


MOLOTOV: He [Beria] was a good organizer, a good administrator- -and a born security operative, of course. But quite without principles.

I had a sharp clash with Beria the first week after Stalin's death. It is quite possible that I was not the one to meet either his or Khrushchev's requirements. Their policies would not have differed greatly.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 341

MOLOTOV: ...He [Beria] was a talented organizer but a cruel, merciless man.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I W. R. Dee, 1993, p. 177

Pole Pole Mzungu. Welcome to Tanzania, the land where dead cows are lying and dogs are flying. But be careful of the ju-wai-biems. Now let's search for some Schtonetools and after that let's go to Tohu-Wa-Bohu (also known as Mto-Wa-Mbu/Moskitotown)

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 Betreff des Beitrags: Re: about Berija
BeitragVerfasst: Mo 6. Aug 2007, 17:35 

Beiträge: 132
Hallo, kannst Du ggf. mal die wesentlichen aussagen zusammenfassen, würden mich interessieren. wer ist GvS? War es ein Tippfehler und sit GDS gemeint?

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 Betreff des Beitrags: Re: about Berija
BeitragVerfasst: Mo 6. Aug 2007, 17:52 

Beiträge: 4023
progress hat geschrieben:
wer ist GvS?

"GvS" ist richtig, es handelt sich da um eine Person, die so getan hat, als fände sie Sozialismus toll um darüber die Erbauer des Sozialismus (Pieck, Stalin, etc...) zu diskredieren.

Der Marxismus ist allmächtig – weil er wahr ist. (E.C.)

“Die Stellung zum Vermächtnis Willi Dickhuts ist der Prüfstein für den Kampf zwischen proletarischer und kleinbürgerlicher Denkweise!” (RF/MLPD)

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 Betreff des Beitrags: Re: about Berija
BeitragVerfasst: Fr 23. Jul 2010, 16:00 

Beiträge: 2
Vor kurzem las ich ein Buch von Beria - nicht über Beria, aber von Beria. Es stimmt sicherlich, daß Beria, wie in dem Beitrag (about Beria) wiederholt mit Nachdruck bestätigt wird, weniger wußte als so und so - also nicht so eingeweiht war. Seinem Vortrag, erschienen im Band 20 der Bücherei des ML - Zur Geschichte der bolschewistischen Organisationen in Transkaukasien, ist zu entnehmen, daß er wesentliche Punkte der Ideologie und theoretischen Arbeit Stalins schon kannte. Sein Vortrag enthält eine kernige Zusammenfassung. Es wird ja beabsichtigt die Geschichte der Bolschewiki zu beleuchten. Es werden auch sehr aufschlußreiche Bezüge zu den wirtschaftlichen Verhältnissen in der Gegend Transkaukasien hergestellt. Genosse Stalin leitet den ersten erfolgreichen Streik auf den Erdölfeldern und dergleichen. Nicht belanglos ist, daß die Ölgesellschaft der Gebrüder Nobel damals vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg das führende Unternehmen im Ölgeschäft war oder daß das Reich Rockefellers dort gegründet wird. Es scheint mir, daß Berias Wissen über die Machenschaften in Transkaukasien eher noch viel mehr Respekt verdient. Wenn Rußland der deutschen Weltherrschaft im Weg steht, dann ist es wahrscheinlich wegen dem obengenannten Stück Erde, wo ohnehin schon sämtliche Staaten mitmischen. Es scheint also desto verdächtiger, wenn durch Katyn oder andere Knochenhügel von dem wirtschaftlichen Zusammenhang abgelenkt wird. Jedenfalls möchte ich zur Lektüre anregen unter

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 Betreff des Beitrags: Re: about Berija
BeitragVerfasst: Mo 5. Sep 2011, 16:36 

Beiträge: 132
Ohne meine eigene Meinung einzubringen - obwohl es da auch viel zu sagen gäbe -, zitiere ich mal nur aus der englischen Wikipedia, wissend, dass das so nicht stimmen muss (auf Korrekturen und Randbemerkungen verzichte ich, ist eine reine Übersetzung):

"Wie er versprochen hatte, wurde er nach Stalins Tod 1953 Stellvertretender Premierminister, als welcher er eine kurze Liberalisierungskampagne initiierte. Die wirtschaftlichen Gegebenheiten während der sowjetischen Allianz mit dem Westen im 2. Weltkrieg wie auch Stalins irrationaler Hass in seinen letzten Lebensjahren desillusionierten Berija ideologisch; er sprach von "Entbolschewisierung" und sehnte sich nach dem Wohlstand und den Ressourcen, die ein lukrativer Frieden mit den USA bringen könnten."

"Berija ging auf Nummer Sicher, indem er in Baku gleichzeitig für die antibolschewistischen "Mussawisten" arbeitete. Nachdem die Stadt im April 1920 eingenommen wurde, wurde Berijas Hinrichtung nur durch die mangelnde Zeit für ihre Vorbereitung sowie durch die Fürsprache Sergei Kirovs verhindert."

"Sergo [Ordshonikidse - R.] und Kirov stellten sich schnell gegen Berija, ebenso Stalins Frau."

"Am 13. Januar 1953 wurde die größte antisemitische Kampagne gestartet: Die "Ärzteverschwörung". Eine hohe Anzahl jüdischer Ärzte wurden beschuldigt, sowjetische Führer vergiftet zu haben, und verhaftet. (...) Ein paar Tage nach Stalins Tod ließ Berija alle verhafteten Ärzte frei, gestand, dass die ganze Kampagne frei erfunden war und ließ die beteiligten MGB-Funktionäre verhaften."

"Nachdem Losgatschev vergeblich versuchte, Berija zu erklären, dass es dem zu diesem Zeitpunkt bewusstlose Stalin "schlecht [ginge] und [er] medizinische Behandlung brauch[e]", wies Berija dies verärgert als Panikmache zurück und befahl ihm: "Belästigen Sie uns nicht, verursachen Sie keine Panik und lassen Sie den Genossen Stalin in Ruhe"."

"Obwohl der gesamte Stalinsche Machtzirkel (selbst Molotov, der vor der sicheren Vernichtung gerettet wurde) ungeniert weinend vor dem Sarg stand, erschien Berija Berichten zu Folge "strahlend vor kaum verhohlener Freude". Er bleib nur kurz und verließ den Raum sehr bald, die traurige Atmosphäre mit einem lauten Ruf nach seinem Fahrer durchbrechend, den Svetlana [Allilujeva] den "unverhohlenen Ruf des Triumphes" nannte."

"Stalin hatte bereits Jahre vor seinem Tod Material über Berija gesammelt."

Natürlich sagt niemand, dass das alles genau stimmt. Und bei vielen Punkten (Molotov so gut wie ausgelöscht, "antisemitische Kampagne") muss ich natürlich energisch widersprechen. Doch letzten Endes sehen wir hier dieselbe Linie wie bei Chruschtschov - "Entbolschewisierung", "Liberalisierung", "friedliche Koexistenz" usw.

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